Gubernatorial Executive Orders or Bills? Determinants of States’ Action Choice during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Abstract

What account for the features of policymaking during a crisis? Why did some states rely more heavily on gubernatorial executive orders (GEOs) than others do during the COVID-19 pandemic, though GEOs were primary action for tackling crises. The recent literature on rulemaking has highlighted the way that the expertise gap between the executive branch and the legislature drives more active responses from agencies. I argue that the interbranch expertise gap deteriorates states’ overall response capacity because the expertise gap leads to a greater passiveness in the legislative body. Drawing upon a data set of state actions in GEO use and bills from February 29 through April 23, 2020, I demonstrate that less professional lawmakers delegate lawmaking authority to their relatively more professional executive peers to address complicated issues during a crisis. More importantly, the findings reveal that the decreased productivity of the legislature is too significant for the increased number of GEOs to compensate for. This study shows an unintended consequence of the interbranch expertise gap on states’ overall response capacity.